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IN THE FISCAL YEAR ending June 1968, 659 private civil
antitrust cases were commenced in the federal district courts,' more
than triple the number of cases filed in the same time period 10
years before.
2
There are no statistics available to indicate what number or per-
centage of the 1,360 private antitrust cases pending as of June 30,
1968,' were filed as a result of information disclosed in prior or
pending United States Government civil or criminal antitrust actions.
It is evident however that a large bulk of the pending private cases
are related in subject matter to government actions.' Most of the
cases which have been brought before the Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation were based on complaints which closely followed
government complaints or indictments.' Presently pending are clusters
of cases seeking treble damages across broad industry lines for violations
t Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. A.B., Temple University, 1953; LL.B.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1956.
1. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
197 (1968).
2. 1958 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 238.
3. See note 1 supra at 203.
4. See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2329 (1955). It
was estimated in 1959 that 76 to 78 percent of the private suits follow in the wake of
successful government actions. Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble
Damage Actions, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 7 (1959).
5. The Panel was created by Congress in 1968 to consider transfer of actions
having common questions of law or facts to one district for pretrial proceedings. For
consideration of the statute; the Rules of Procedure adopted by this Panel; and some
of the orders issued by the Panel, see Comment, A Survey of Federal Multidistrict
Litigation - 28 U.S.C. § 1407, 15 VILL. L. REV. 916 (1970).
Private antitrust actions following government actions are, e.g., In re Con-
crete Pipe, 302 F. Supp. 244 (J.P.M.L. 1969) (30 cases consolidated and transferred) ;
In re Gypsum Wallboard, 297 F. Supp. 1350 (J.P.M.L. 1969) (50 cases ordered
consolidated) ; In re Library Edition of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385 (J.P.M.L.
1968) (21 cases ordered consolidated and transferred) ; In re Plumbing Fixture Cases,
295 F. Supp. 33 (J.P.M.L. 1968) (39 cases ordered consolidated and transferred).
Cases brought subsequent to the original transfer orders are sent to the transferee
court shortly after they are filed. See In re Antibiotic Drugs, 303 F. Supp. 1056(J.P.M.L. 1969) ; In re Plumbing Fixtures, 302 F. Supp. 795 (J.P.M.L. 1969) ; In re
Gypsum Wallboard, 302 F. Supp. 794 (J.P.M.L. 1969) ; In re Protection Devices,
295 F. Supp. 39 (J.P.M.L. 1968) (80 cases ordered consolidated and transferred);
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of the antitrust laws affecting drugs, plumbing fixtures, library books,
gasoline and bread.
These cases generally involve plaintiffs from the public sectors
of the economy - states, cities, school districts, public libraries - as
well as private purchasers at all levels of distribution. To add to the
complexity is the relatively new concept asserted by states and some
cities of their right to sue on behalf of all citizens and consumers within
their confines under a "parens patriae" doctrine.6
In large part this influx of private litigation owes its very existence
to the concern of the Department of Justice over industrial practices
which have affected prices of goods purchased by governmental entities,
often on public or sealed bids. It has now become axiomatic that a
government complaint alleging bid rigging or territorial allocation will
be followed immediately by private suits on behalf of municipalities
and states within the area alleged to be affected. Recently, substantial
settlements with local governments have been reported following federal
government actions, even without the filing of a complaint by the
local government.
This mass of litigation presents procedural and substantive prob-
lems and issues novel in the administration of the federal courts. In fact,
it was the large number of cases filed throughout the country following
the termination of 20 government criminal cases against the electrical
manufacturers and the procedure which evolved for handling the dis-
covery aspects of 1880 related private suits7 which eventually resulted
in the amendment of the Judicial Code to provide for transfer of
related cases pending in many district courts to one district for
consolidated pretrial proceedings.'
The concentration of such cases before one judge has tended to
focus perhaps more directly than before upon the relationship of this
6. The doctrine has been rejected in Hawaii v. Standard Oil of California, 1970
Trade Cas. fr 73,340 (9th Cir. 1970) reversing 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii 1969)
and Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Pa. 1969), but accepted in San Francisco v. Charles
Pfizer & Co., 1969 Trade Cases ff 72,928 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
7. See Neal & Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel
Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621 (1964); Note, Release of Grand Jury
Minutes in the National Deposition Program of the Electrical Equipment Cases,
112 U. PA. L. REV. 1133 (1964).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 140 7 (a) (Supp. IV 1968):
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made
by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its
determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and will promote a just and efficient conduct of such
actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before
the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was
transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated. . ..
See generally Comment, note 5 supra.
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litigation to the preceding or pending government actions. While
the statute is still new and experience under the transferred cases has
not reached a point where a trend is clear, it does appear that one
result will be the liberalization of judicial opinion on the uses to which
the prior United States Government proceedings can be put in the
related civil litigation.
It is the purpose of this article to examine the extent to which
the private litigant benefits from a prior or pending related government
action, and to consider whether changes in the statutory scheme
are appropriate.
II. TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The courts in recent years have indicated that they view the
tolling provision of the Clayton Act as one of the principal means
intended by the Congress to assist litigants following in the footsteps
of the government suit. The prior tendency to interpret this provision
restrictively has now been reversed on all fronts.
Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act provides:
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by
the United States to prevent, restrain or punish violations of any
of the antitrust laws . . . the running of the statute of limitations
in respect of every private right of action arising under said laws
and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in
said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof
and for one year thereafter . . .9
One of the threshold issues arising under this section was whether
it applied to a proceeding brought by the Federal Trade Commission
since the statute by its terms refers only to "any civil or criminal
proceeding . . . instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain
or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws."
A conflict between the circuits' ° was resolved by the Supreme
Court in Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing
Co.," where it held that a Federal Trade Commission proceeding
brought under the antimerger provisions of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act 2 would toll the statute of limitations for a damage plaintiff
who claimed that the challenged acquisition of a distributor by a
9. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964).
10. Compare New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
332 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 311 (1965), with Highland Supply Corp.
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964).
11. 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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producer of electrical installment materials violated Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act.' 8
The Court recognized that there was little legislative history
suggesting that Congress intended to include F.T.C. proceedings
within the tolling provision. However it found support for its decision
in Congress' intention to use private self interest as a means of
enforcement of the antitrust laws.' 4 The Court said:
In resolving this question we must necessarily rely on the one
element of congressional intention which is plain on the record -
the clearly expressed desire that private parties be permitted the
benefits of prior government actions. 15
Since the Federal Trade Commission had sued, in the Minnesota
Mining case, to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 16 a statute which
is specifically defined as an "antitrust law" by statutory definition, 7
the Supreme Court was not faced with the question of the applicability
of the tolling provision to proceedings brought by the Federal Trade
Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act,'8 which does
not fall within the statutory definition of an "antitrust law." Most
of the courts which thereafter faced this question held that the statutory
language was clear and that since the tolling provision is limited to
prior proceedings with respect to "any of the antitrust laws" a Federal
Trade Commission proceeding pursuant to Section 5 of -the Federal
Trade Commission Act cannot be given tolling effect.' 9 Recently,
however, the District Court of Vermont in Lippa & Co., Inc. v. Lenox,
Inc.,2° chose not to follow this reasoning. The court, although recog-
nizing that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act could
not be considered an "antitrust law" held that it did not follow that
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
14. 381 U.S. at 319-20.
15. Id. at 320. Senate Report No. 619 states: "At the time of enactment of
the Sherman Act, the major emphasis was upon methods of enforcement, and it was
believed that the most effective method, in addition to the imposition of penalties by
the United States, was to provide for treble damage suits. It was originally hoped that
this would encourage private litigants to bear a considerable amount of the burden
of and expense of enforcement and thus save the Government time and money."
S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), published in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2329 (1955).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964). These "antitrust laws" are: The Sherman Act (Act
of July 2, 1890, C. 647, 26 Stat. 209) ; The Clayton Act (Act of October 15, 1914,
C. 323, 38 Stat. 730) ; and the Wilson Tariff Act (Act of August 27, 1894, C. 349,
§§ 73-77, 28 Stat. 570, as amended Act of February 12, 1913, C. 40, 37 Stat. 667). See
Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958), holding that this list
is exclusive.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964).
19. Rader v. Balfour, 1969 Trade Cas. ff 72,709 (N.D. Ill. 1968) ; Laitram Corp.
v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 279 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. La. 1968) ; Y & Y Popcorn Supply
Company v. ABC Vending Corp., 263 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
20. 305 F. Supp. 182 (D. Vt. 1969).
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proceedings brought pursuant to that section are not brought to
"prevent, restrain or punish violations of any antitrust laws.""1
Because of the breadth of the prohibitions of Section 5(a)(1)
of the Federal Trade Commission Act,22 many proceedings brought
under that statute are brought to "restrain or punish violations of
any of the antitrust laws" within the concept of the tolling provision.
The court chose not to follow a path requested by plaintiff which would
require the court to decide in each instance whether the Federal Trade
Commission complaint alleges facts which constitute violations of one
or more of the antitrust laws. Instead, this court relied on language
in Supreme Court cases that the purpose of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act is designed to "stop in their incipiency acts and practices
which, when full blown, would violate" either the Sherman or Clayton
Acts.23  The court, in Lippa, held that all actions under the Federal
Trade Commission Act other than those against deceptive practices
are brought to "prevent . . . violations of the antitrust laws" within
the meaning of Section 5(a), and hence such actions toll the statute
of limitations for subsequent private litigants.24 While the decision
has yet to be followed by other courts, it is, as the court itself
characterized it, "consistent with the philosophy expressed in Minnesota
Mining"'2 ' and would certainly be one of the more practical benefits
in view of the length of time before completion of many Federal
Trade Commission proceedings.
The liberal policy approach taken by the Supreme Court affects
not only ,the question of whether the tolling provision applies but
how it is to be interpreted. Shortly after its decision in the Minnesota
Mining case the Supreme Court was faced with the "restrictive in-
terpretation" of Section 5(b) applied by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit which held that its applicability was limited to
situations in which "[t]he same means must be used to achieve the
same objectives of the same conspiracies by the same defendants."2
In Leh v. General Petroleum Corp.,27 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
that the tolling provision must be "read in light of Congress' belief that
private antitrust litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective
21. Id. at 184-85.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
23. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953);
See also Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941).
24. 305 F. Supp. at 184-85.
25. Id. at 189.
26. Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190, 196 (9th Cir. 1956).
Contra, Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961),
appeal dismissed under rule 60 sub nora., Wade v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp.,
371 U.S. 801 (1962), which held that the running of the period of limitations is tolled
by section 5(b) if there is "substantial identity of subject matter." 300 F.2d at 570.
27. 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965).
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enforcement of the antitrust laws." Noting that the language of the
tolling provision applies to cases based "in whole or in part on any
matter complained of" in the government proceeding, the Court held
that identity of parties and alleged time period of the conspiracy
were not required.28
Thus, in that case, an independent gasoline wholesaler who charged
that the oil companies conspired to eliminate jobbers and retailers was
permitted to benefit from a civil government suit although plaintiff's
complaint alleged a conspiracy beginning in 1948 and continuing until
1956, while the conspiracy alleged in the government suit ran from
1936 to 1950. In addition, two of the eight defendants named by the
government were not sued in the private action. 9 The Court refused
to conclude that a private claimant can invoke Section 5(b) "only
if the conspiracy of which he complains has the breadth and scope in
time and participants as the conspiracy described in the government
action on which he relies." 30
After the Supreme Court's cautionary directions against a "nig-
gardly construction of the statutory language,"'" the lower courts have
now looked to policy reasons to justify their new broad interpretation
of the tolling provisions. Following the language, albeit dicta, in the
Leh case the courts have held that the tolling provision applies as to
individuals not even sued or named as co-conspirators in the prior
government suit."2 Recent decisions have rejected the earlier holdings
of the movie industry cases which calculated the end of the suspension
28. Id. at 59, quoting from 381 U.S. 311, 318.
29. The plaintiff had sued one company, Olympia Oil Producers, who was not a
defendant in the government proceeding but who was dismissed from the case prior to
the ruling on defendants' statute of limitations defense. Thus, the question of the
applicability of section 5(b) to defendants in the civil suit who were not named in the
criminal suit has not been before the Court. However, an indication of its attitude on
that issue is seen from the following dicta in the Leh case: "In suits of this kind, the
absence of complete identity of defendants may be explained on several grounds
unrelated to the question of whether the private claimant's suit is based on matters
of which the Government complained ... some of the conspirators whose activities
injured the private claimant may have been too low in the conspiracy to be selected
as named defendants or co-conspirators in the Government's necessarily broader net."
382 U.S. at 63-64.
30. Id. at 63.
31. Id. at 59.
32. See note 29 supra. New Jersey v. Morton Salt Co., 387 F.2d 94 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 967 (1968) ; Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp.
35 (D. Minn. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 912 (1967) ; Vermont v. Cayuga Rock Salt Co., 276 F.
Supp. 970 (D. Me. 1967) ; Maricopa County v. American Pipe and Construction Co.,
303 F. Supp. 77 (D. Ariz. 1969), aff'd 1970 Trade Cas. " 73,314 (9th Cir. 1970).
Contra, Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 418 F.2d 21, 25 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 979 (1970) : ("The law of this circuit is that the tolling
of the limitations protects the plaintiff in a private antitrust suit only with respect to
a party defendant in the government suit").
[VOL. 16: p. 57
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss1/4
THE ANTITRUST PLAINTIFF
period on a defendant-by-defendant analysis. 3 Now, the government
litigation is considered to pend as to each defendant until it is con-
cluded as to all of them. 4 The filing of a government civil antitrust
action within a year of the termination of a related indictment has
been held to continue the tolling effect until one year after the end
of the civil suit." Finally, recognizing that "[c]ongressional policy
is 'better served by a test which is easily applied" it has been held
that a prior government suit does not cease to pend until the expiration
of time to take an appeal from the final decree dealing with the relief,
although all questions as to liability had been finally determined in
earlier stages of the litigation. 6
Although, paradoxically, the United States Government does
not fare as well, when suing for its own damages, 7 the statutory
provision for tolling of the statute of limitations is of major assistance
to the treble damage plaintiff. He can sit back and await the conclusion
of the full panoply of government discovery, trial or settlement before
deciding whether to undertake a private suit. Whether he so chooses
may depend on political or tactical considerations, but the option is
his. In theory, if the private plaintiff waits while the Government
proceeds to a successful conclusion in a criminal or civil action, his
labor in the subsequent damage proceeding should be considerably eased.
III. PRIMA FACIE EFFECT OF PRIOR JUDGMENTS
The tolling provision enacted as Section 5(b) of the Clayton
Act in 1914 was only one of the steps taken by Congress in that
Statute as an inducement to the private litigant." Within the same
33. See, e.g., Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284
(7th Cir. 1954); Manny v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.
Calif. 1953).
34. When the Government brought a criminal and a civil suit, the criminal action
ended at different times because one defendant pleaded nolo contendere and the
remaining went to trial and were acquitted. The civil suit likewise ended at different
times because some defendants signed consent decrees and others proceeded to a trial
resulting in a judgment against them which was affirmed on appeal. The government
suit was held to pend until the latter of the two government actions, the civil suit,
was ended as to final defendant. Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35
(D. Minn. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 912 (1967).
35. Maricopa County v. American Pipe and Construction Co., 303 F. Supp. 77
(D. Ariz. 1969), aff'd 1970 Trade Cas. 1 73,314 (9th Cir. 1970).
36. Russ Togs, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 304 F. Supp. 279, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
aff'd, 426 F.2d 850 (2d Cir. 1970). The court expressly rejected the relief-liability
distinction applied by decisions previous to the Minnesota Mining case. See, e.g.,
Baldwin v. Loew's, Inc., 312 F.2d 387, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1963).
37. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 305 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
38. The major inducement to private litigants was the provision for treble damage
recovery. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). "[T]he purpose of giving private parties treble-
damage and injunctive relief was not merely to provide private relief, but was to
serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws." Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969).
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section, Congress sought to confer upon the private litigant the fruits
of the prior government litigation. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act
provides:
A final judgment or decree . . . rendered in any civil or criminal
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under
the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated
said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant
in any action or proceeding brought by any other party against
such defendant under said laws or by the United States under
Section 15a of this title, as to all matters respecting which said
judgment or decree would be an estoppel between the parties
thereto: Provided, that this section shall not apply to consent
judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been
taken. .... . )
In Minnesota Mining the Supreme Court, in ruling for a broad
interpretation of Section 5(a), stressed that there are distinctions
between Sections 5(a) and 5(b) that suggest that they are not wholly
interdependent.4" The Court stated that since the two sections are not
necessarily co-extensive and are governed by other considerations as
well as congressional policy objectives, the applicability of Section
5(a) to Federal Trade Commission actions should not control on the
Section 5 (b) tolling issue.41
Seemingly, this language, in the midst of an opinion stressing
congressional intent to liberalize the rules and application of prior
government suits for prior litigants, could be interpreted to support
the line of lower court cases holding that Federal Trade Commission
orders can not be given prima facie effect within this section.4 2
However, after analyzing congressional history and the precedents,
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has now held that the
same principles which caused the Supreme Court to hold that Federal
Trade Commission proceedings toll the statute of limitations would
also impel holding that a private litigant may have the evidentiary
benefit from that final commission order as within Section 5(b).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1955).
40. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
at 316.
41. Id. at 317-18.
42. Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 245 F. Supp. 510, 514 (E.D.
Mo. 1965) ; United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 356 (D. Mass.
1950) (dictum) ; International Tag & Salesbook Co. v. American Salesbook Co.,
6 F.R.D. 45, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (in dictum, the court expressed doubt that an F.T.C.
proceeding came within section 5(a)) ; Proper v. John Bene & Sons, Inc., 295 F. 729(E.D.N.Y. 1923).
[VOL. 16 : p. 57
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In Farmington Dowel Products Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., Inc.,4
the court noted that the passage of the Finality Act44 resolved the
prior uncertainty as to whether a final commission order is considered
a "judgment or decree."4 Since it now is so considered, and since
the defendant has had his day in court with appropriate procedural
safeguards, the court reasoned that there were no obstacles to holding
that a prior Federal Trade Commission order to the effect that the
defendant had violated Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act46 fell within the language of Section
5(b)." This decision was followed in a case decided shortly thereafter
by a California district court.48
While these decisions seem to be leading to a broad, all inclusive
interpretation of this section, there remains one area in which the
courts have consistently foreclosed use of the prior suit. It is now well
established that a judgment entered on a plea of nolo contendere is ex-
cluded by proviso from the scope of section 5 (a), and most courts have
stricken references to the plea appearing in treble damage complaints. 9
43. 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1969).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 2 1(g-l) (1964).
45. In Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. American Bowling and Billiard Corp.,150 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 757 (1945), the Court of Appeals re-
versed its initial decision that a final F.T.C. order finding a violation of section 3 ofthe Clayton Act was within section 5 (a) and held, per curiam, that it was not includedbecause an F.T.C. Clayton Act order was not operative without an enforcing decree
by a Court of Appeals. 150 F.2d at 74.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
47. 421 F.2d at 62. In Carpenter v. Central Arkansas Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc.,1966 Trade Cas. 71,817 (W.D. Ark. 1966), the court held that an F.T.C. order
entered into by consent but after testimony had been given, while the Examiner'sdecision was on appeal, would fall within section 5(a).
48. Purex Corp., Ltd. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584 (C.D. Cal.1970). Even if the F.T.C. orders are covered by section 5(a), as being within the
scope of the "final judgment or decree," there remains, under this section, the question
as to what type of F.T.C. proceeding is covered. The language of the section requires
that it be brought "under the antitrust laws," as distinguished from the language in
section 5(b) referring to proceedings "to prevent, restrain or punish violations of any
of the antitrust laws." It was the inclusion of language such as "prevent" which led to
the ruling that proceedings under section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act are within the ambit of the tolling provision, (see pages 60-61 supra), and
the absence of such language in section 5(a) might lead to a different ruling. See
Y & Y Popcorn Supply Co. v. A.B.C. Vending Corp., 263 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa.1967). (F.T.C. order held inadmissible because record was not clear whether it was
to the effect that defendants violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18(1950), which would have been given prima facie effect, or section 5 of the F.T.C.
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), which, according to the court, does not rise to the level
of an "antitrust law" and was not entitled to prima facie effect.)49. City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Common-
wealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964) ; Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 207 F.Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 312 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.909 (1963) ; City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1961 Trade Cas.
f 70,143 (E.D. Pa. 1962) ; Alden-Rochelle v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors,
and Publishers, 3 F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ; Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co.,26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939). Whatever may be the ultimate decision by the trial
court on the admissibility of the nolo contendere plea, it could be argued that there islittle point for haste in striking allegations from the complaint, particularly in dis-
tricts in which the complaint is not shown to the jury. See Tivoli Realty, Inc. v.
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Some defendants have attempted to broaden the scope of the
proviso by arguing that a guilty plea proffered in the prior government
criminal action (as distinguished from a judgment entered after a
trial) should be considered a "consent judgment" and therefore have
no prima facie effect.5" This position has been consistently rejected
by the courts.5'
Once it is accepted that a guilty plea is to be given prima facie
effect within the meaning of Section 5 (a), the private plaintiff faces the
practical problems of precisely what gets introduced into evidence, and
of what help it actually is. The problem, first arising in the electric
cases, was handled differently by the various trial judges. In the first
case to be tried, Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Westinghouse, et al.," the
plaintiff, on the second day, offered into evidence the paragraph of the
government's indictment which alleged the substantive offense.53 The
court permitted it to be read to the jury and instructed them:
The Court: [Judge Joseph S. Lord, III] Members of the Jury,
you have heard read to you a portion of the Indictment to which
these defendants pleaded guilty. The effect of that plea of guilty
is -that the Indictment and plea are prima facie evidence of the
Paramount Pictures, 80 F. Supp. 800, 804 (D. Del. 1948). The nolo contendere plea
may be admissible to impeach a witness. Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779,
784 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. f1 73,294
(W.D. Okla. 1968) (nolo contendere plea may be used in cross-examining corporate
officers produced by defendant). In Vitagraph, Inc. v. Perelman, 95 F.2d 142 (3d Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 610 (1938), the court admitted testimony of a prior
consent decree, not as prima facie evidence, but as a fact to show certain activity
of defendants.
50. In argument for this position, see Seamans, First Aid to the Plaintiff, 32
ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 56 (1966) ; Note, The Admissibility and Scope of Guilty Pleas
in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 71 YALE L.J. 684 (1962).
51. General Elec. Co. v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964) ; City
of Burbank, California v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Common-
wealth Edison Co. v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964). It should be possible to admit the guilty plea under
common law rules of evidence as an admission. See Simco Sales Serv. of Pa., Inc. v.
Air Reduction Co., 213 F. Supp. 505, 507-08 (E.D. Pa. 1963) ; Note, supra note 50,
at 689. A decision striking references to such guilty pleas, Northwestern Elec. Power
Cooperative, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 30 F.R.D. 557 (W.D. Mo. 1961), was filed
before the court of appeals decisions, cited above, and appears to be out of the
mainstream of these cases.
52. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Civil No. 30015 (E.D.
Pa., June 2, 1964). The jury, after two and one-half months of trial, returned a
verdict of $9,657,505.75 for the three plaintiffs involved, resulting in a trebled judg-
ment of $28,972,517.25.
53. Paragraph 10 of the indictment from the previous criminal action, United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., No. 20361 (E.D. Pa., filed May 25, 1960), read:
Beginning at least as early as 1956, the exact date being to the Grand Jurors
unknown, and continuing thereafter up to and including the date of the return
of this indictment, the defendants together with other persons to the Grand Jurors
unknown, have engaged in a combination and conspiracy in unreasonable restraint
of the aforesaid interstate trade and commerce in power transformers, in viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890, entitled "An Act to
Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies," as
amended . . . commonly known as the Sherman Act.
See Record, June 1, at 7705, Philadelphia Elec. Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
Civil No. 30015 (E.D. Pa., June 2, 1964).
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facts contained therein; namely, prima facie evidence that the
defendants did conspire to violate the Sherman Act, which is
the antitrust act.
Prima facie evidence means that kind of evidence which estab-
lishes at first glance, or which establishes of itself a given set
of facts, and which remains in the case throughout the trial and
would be sufficient in itself to prove those facts without other
evidence. It may however, be rebutted by the defendants by
evidence which would rebut it if believed by you. It is not proof
of any means by which the conspiracy, which has been admitted,
was carried out, and it is proof only of the existence of the con-
spiracy during the period charged in the Indictment; namely
from 1956 to 1960; nor is it any proof that the plaintiffs have
been damaged by the conspiracy which has been admitted by
the plea of guilty.54
In his charge to the jury at the conclusion of the trial, Judge
Lord again read paragraph 10 of the Indictment to the jury, charged
them that "that plea of guilty is prima facie evidence that the defendants
did at some time at least between 1956 and 1960 conspire to violate
the Antitrust Act in respect to power transformers," '55 and instructed
them as to the meaning of "prima facie" evidence in language similar
to that which he used at the beginning of the trial.5"
Plaintiff's counsel in another of the electrical cases was permitted
to read to the jury more extensive portions of the indictment than in
Philadelphia Electric but then the court instructed the jury that only
two parts of the indictment containing the general allegation of
conspiracy and its purposes were relevant. 7  In the case tried in
Kansas City, on the other hand, the court refused to permit the
plaintiffs to refer to either the indictment or the guilty plea because
the defendant, in the Pretrial Report, had admitted that a conspiracy
had existed, and hence the court ruled that the prior guilty plea
was irrelevant.55
The application of the "prima facie" provision becomes more
complex when the prior government action has ended in a general
verdict of guilty. In Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,59
the Supreme Court was faced with the question of how to use such
54. Id., March 17, at 175-76.
55. Id., June 1, at 7705.
56. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1964 Trade Cas. 71,123(E.D. Pa. 1964).
57. Northwestern Elec. Power Cooperative v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., Civil
No. 13920-3 (W.D. Mo., December 16, 1964).
58. San Antonio v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Civil No. 3064 (W.D. Tex.,
December 17, 1964).
59. 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
NOVEMBER 1970]
11
Korman: The Antitrust Plaintiff Following in the Government's Footsteps
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
a general guilty verdict for the benefit of the subsequent private
damage plaintiff. Five possibilities were presented. The private plaintiff
urged that the entire record in the criminal action should be admissible
in the private case. The trial judge had held that only the indictment,
verdict, and judgment should go to the jury. The Court of Appeal6
had ruled the judgment was prima facie evidence only of conspiracy.
The defendant argued that since -the indictment charged a single
conspiracy to perform some 26 different acts, and proof of only one
of them would have supported a guilty verdict, it is -impossible to
determine on which it was based and hence the judgment has no
relevance in the private action.6° The position of the United States,
as amicus curiae, was that the judgment was prima facie evidence
both of the conspiracy and -of the performance of such acts in accom-
plishing it as the criminal jury necessarily found to have occurred as
determined by the trial judge in the subsequent damage action through
examination of the entire criminal trial record. This was the position
accepted by the Supreme Court which directed the trial judge (1) to
examine the record of the prior criminal case to determine the issues
actually decided by the judgment, (2) to reconstruct it to the jury
to the extent he deems necessary to acquaint them fully with the issues
and (3) to explain the scope and effect of the prior judgment on the
case at trial.6'
The decree in the prior government case does not necessarily
limit the scope of the later use of the judgment if an examination
of the record in the government action shows in actuality more was
determined than set forth there. In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp.,62 the defendant, who had previously been
found to have monopolized the shoe machinery market in violation
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 68 by reason of certain restrictive leasing
practices, argued that the decree entered in the government action
did not specifically find that the lease-only policy it had practiced was
an instrument of the monopolization. The Supreme Court, noting
that the decree in fact condemned only certain clauses in the standard
lease, and did not expressly characterize other aspects of the leasing
system as illegal monopolization, nevertheless held the private plaintiff
60. Id. at 567.
61. Id. at 572. This was followed by the District Court in Michigan v. Morton
Salt, 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois,
377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1967), where the court reviewed in detail the prior criminal
record in order to ascertain what was adjudicated.
62. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). The prior government action against United Shoe
is reported in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
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was not so limited. "If by reference to the findings, opinion, and decree
it is determined that an issue was actually adjudicated in an antitrust
suit brought by the Government, the private plaintiff can treat the
outcome of the Government's case as prima facie evidence on that
issue."6 In the prima facie cases as in the statute of limitations cases,
the Supreme Court's lead in broad statutory construction to aid the
treble damage plaintiff has 'been followed by more expansive interpreta-
tion of the statutory language by the lower courts.65
Despite language in cases which indicates that the purpose
of Section 5(a) is to give private litigants a formidable weapon, 6
its actual accomplishments may be somewhat less potent. In no way
does it measurably decrease the overwhelming task of discovery -
the long, 'tortuous process in which often scores of lawyers are engaged
for years in ferreting out facts in what is now termed "waves of
discovery.''67 Nor has the experience shown that it either decreases
the length of time from inception to ultimate disposition of an antitrust
case or the actual length of trial.
It is highly unlikely that a lawyer in an antitrust case would
limit the presentation of his case to the jury to damages, relying for
proof of liability on the relevant portions of the indictment and the guilty
plea, or on instructions as to the findings in the prior government case.
In the first place, the government in its enforcement of the antitrust laws
need not press for an indictment which necessarily covers the full scope
and depth of an antitrust conspiracy. Intensive discovery in several
of the private consolidated cases has uncovered conspiratorial meetings
before the time alleged in the indictment and aspects of conspiratorial
conduct not covered by the indictment. A lawyer seeking treble dam-
ages for a client cannot afford to rely on the guilty plea which admits
only some portion of the conspiracy during the four year statutory
64. 392 U.S. at 485.
65. In Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969), the
court reversed a ruling that the plaintiff could not introduce the judgment in United
States v. E.I. duPont DeNemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), for anything other
than historical purposes and background material because it covered a time period
different than the one in this damage plaintiff's action. The Court of Appeals, although
recognizing that no prior case had allowed into evidence a judgment in a government
action which covered violations prior in time to those alleged in the damage action,
held that the circumstances in the duPont situation, (identical defendants, same
product lines, and same geographical market), made it "both appropriate and desirable
to give substantial evidentiary weight to the judgment entered in duPont I." 414
F.2d at 963.
66. "Section 5(a) is undoubtedly a powerful deterrent to antitrust violators and
an enviable weapon in the armory of the treble damage suitor." Y & Y Popcorn
Supply Co. v. A.B.C. Vending Corp., 263 F. Supp. 709, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
67. See COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR MULTIPLE LITIGATION OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRIcT
LITIGATION, Vol. 1 (pt. 2), (Sage Hill ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
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period, or on a prior government record which may prove less than he
needs to sustain his claim.
Secondly, the private plaintiff must still satisfy the jury (or
trial court) that he was injured as a result of the antitrust violation
and must establish the amount of the damages.
Thirdly, as long as the prima facie section gives the defendants
the opportunity to rebut, reliance upon the guilty plea or the prior
findings alone would merely shift the order of proof. Defendants
undoubtedly would offer testimony in an attempt to convince the
trier of fact that the antitrust violation was limited in scope and
geography, short lived, and ineffective. Thus plaintiff would be re-
quired in redirect to place before the trier of fact the full array of
evidence to prove the scope and effect of the antitrust violation.
Finally, plaintiffs' lawyers generally believe that the jury in
dealing with the assessment of damages, complex and difficult in any
antitrust case, would be hard put to understand the impact of the
conduct on the price of the product, without the background material
about the conspiracy to put the matter into context. Trial lawyers
undoubtedly believe that the repetition of evidence of conspiratorial
meeting after meeting, telephone contact after telephone contact, may
bear directly on the ultimate damage awarded, whatever its legal con-
nection thereto may be. Therefore it is in the psychological effect
on the jury of knowledge that these defendants had previously been
indicted and admitted guilt or found guilty, rather than on any legal
consequence of "prima facie effect," that the treble damage plaintiff
has his most potent use of the prior judgment.
IV. EVIDENTIARY ASSISTANCE
A. Grand Jury Documents
The 1955 Congressional Report 6 which accompanied the amend-
ment to the Clayton Act stated: "Since the enactment of the Clayton
Act, the bulk of private antitrust litigation has followed successful
Government action, so that the judgment and decrees in the Federal
proceedings could be used to establish a case. Amassing evidence
for antitrust cases would otherwise be a prohibitively expensive task
for most plaintiffs." 0  The Supreme Court has commented that
"government proceedings are recognized as a major source of evidence
for private parties. '7 0
68. S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), published in 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2329 (1955).
69. Id.
70. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
311, 319 (1965).
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Presumably, if the Government has decided to indict or sue civilly
on the grounds of antitrust violations, there must have come to the
Government's attention persuasive information to support this claim.
Thus, by subpoenaing of documents either before or in conjunction
with grand jury testimony, the Government has wide range to unearth
all documentary evidence relating to or supporting the charges of the
indictment or the complaint. While many conspiracies are not docu-
mented with Boswellian minutiae, obviously this advance ground-
breaking at least identifies the relevant categories of documents and
can be of considerable assistance to plaintiffs, who now generally seek
production of such documents enmasse.
Following the court's refusal to permit prospective plaintiffs to
inspect and copy grand jury subpoenas served in the electrical cases, 7 '
the plaintiffs renewed their efforts to obtain such information after
initiation of their civil suits. In the consolidated discovery, the courts
entered pretrial orders requiring each defendant to place in a central
depository copies and lists of the various corporate documents that
had been submitted to -the grand juries investigating the industry.72
In subsequent antitrust litigation it has not been uncommon for
defendants to voluntarily produce for plaintiffs' examination copies
of their grand jury documents.
However, in the "library book" antitrust cases,78 the defendants
contested production of these documents. The several grand juries
which had subpoenaed documents did not return indictments, but
the government instituted eighteen civil actions for injunctive relief
which were promptly settled by consent decrees. 74  Treble damage
plaintiffs sought to intervene in the government's civil action to obtain
copies of the documents, and although intervention was denied,75 the
71. Application of State of California, 195 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1961). The
Federal Trade Commission was also denied the right to inspect the grand jury docu-
ments and testimony. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 29 F.R.D. 151 (E.D. Pa. 1961),
aff'd, 309 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1962). In damage actions filed by the United States, the
attempt by the defendants to prevent the use of the grand jury documents and testi-
mony by attorneys for the United States was denied but granted as to attorneys for
the Tennessee Valley Authority. United States v. General Elec. Co., 209 F. Supp.
197, 198-202 (E.D. Pa. 1962). In United States v. General Elec. Co., 211 F. Supp. 641
(E.D. Pa. 1962), the Government was required to return the original documents to the
defendants and work from copies.
72. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp. 729
(N.D. Ill. 1962).
73. Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1969 Trade Cas. ff 72,784 (N.D.
Ill. 1968), writ of mandamus denied (7th Cir., January 6, 1969), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
944 (1969).
74. United States v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1967 Trade Cas. 72,256
(N.D. Ill. 1967).
75. The order of the court denying intervention (unreported) was affirmed in
City of New York v. United States, 390 U.S. 715 (1968).
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judge directed that the documents remain in the government's posses-
sion. Thereafter, following a series of procedural maneuvers, the
court to whom the cases had been transferred and then consolidated
entered an order requiring defendants to produce the grand jury
documents.76 Defendants sought and were denied a writ of mandamus
in the Seventh Circuit to vacate this paragraph of the pretrial order.77
Defendants then failed in their attempt to get the United States
Supreme Court to take certiorari.
78
Basically, defendants argued that good cause under rule 3479 for
production of documents is not shown in and of itself by the fact
that they have previously been subpoenaed by the government. Since
defendants were unsuccessful, plaintiffs now argue that such documents
are automatically deemed subject to production of documents under
rule 34.
In most instances, examination of such documents will not in
and of itself solve the problem of establishing liability. Generally,
they include thousands of pieces of paper often covering transactions
between defendant and the U. S. Government. Many of the other
,documents need explanation or identification. Nevertheless, the grand
jury documents provide plaintiffs with a shortcut to what may be
the heart of the documentary evidence. Moreover, their prior ex-
amination and indexing by the Government makes their destruction
before viewing by the treble damage plaintiff, whether advertent or
inadvertent, highly unlikely.
B. Grand Jury Testimony
Testimony given to the grand jury can be much more rewarding.
If the government lawyers have prepared carefully (and they generally
do) for the examination of the witness, the grand jury transcript will
encapsulate a summary of all the incriminating evidence of which the
witness is aware. A list of the names of the witnesses who appear
before the grand jury is in and of itself a useful starting point for
the treble damage plaintiff, and an interrogatory requesting identifica-
tion of such witnesses, which many courts have permitted, has now been
approved in the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation.8 °
76. Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1969 Trade Cas. ff 72,784 (N.D.
Ill. 1968).
77. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, (7th Cir., January 6, 1969)
(unreported denial of writ of mandamus).
78. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 394 U.S. 944 (1969).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
80. MANUAL, supra note 67, (pt. 2) at Appendix 1.5, Sample Petrial Order No. 3.
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The testimony itself is obviously one of the principal goals.
Attempts by various defendants under the banner of grand jury secrecy
to make the grand jury an unassailable fortress where its treasures
of information are forever unavailable in subsequent litigation has
finally been rejected in the context of treble damage litigation. The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that disclosure of grand jury testi-
mony is a matter of judicial discretion, although the burden is on
the party seeking disclosure to show a "particularized need" for
the testimony."'
The series of electrical cases initiated a procedure for the use of
grand jury testimony by treble damage plaintiffs in subsequent civil
suits. Shortly after the first witness testified in the National Deposition
Program (which was conducted under the aegis of a deposition judge),
plaintiff moved for the production of the witness' testimony before
the grand jury.82 The defendants' argument that the court had no
power to order disclosure of such testimony to nongovernment litigants
was rejected by reference to the specific language of rule 6(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which permits disclosure "only
when so directed by the court preliminary to or in connection with
a judicial proceeding." 8 Although Chief Judge Thomas J. Clary
affirmed the court's power to order production, he held it was not
warranted in the case of this particular witness. Nevertheless, since
Judge Clary was intimately familiar with all aspects of the staggering
civil litigation which had been instituted in these cases, he recognized
that similar motions would be made in the course of these long and
complex proceedings. Accordingly, he set forth the procedure to be
followed with respect to grand jury testimony. He stated that dis-
closure should never be made for discovery purposes only, and should
be made only when plaintiff had made a showing of particularly com-
pelling need. Determination of such need required an in camera exami-
nation of the transcript by the court, i.e., the judge presiding over the
particular deposition. If disclosure was warranted, only so much of
the transcript should be disclosed as is needed to achieve this result.
81. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966) ; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959) ; United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356
U.S. 677 (1958).
82. The deposition was held in Philadelphia which had also been the site of the
criminal indictments. Thus, it happened that the judge presiding at the deposition,
the Honorable Thomas J. Clary, then Chief Judge of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was also the judicial custodian of the grandjury minutes from the preceding criminal action.
83. Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 486, 488 (E.D. Pa.
1962) (quoting rule 6(e) of the FED. R. CRIM. P.), appeal dismissed, Civil No. 14296
(3d Cir., Feb. 21, 1963).
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Finally Judge Clary agreed that he would send the transcript to the
deposition judge upon request.8 4
Thereafter, depending upon the circumstances, various of the
deposition judges agreed to permit disclosure of portions of the grand
jury testimony during the depositions of witnesses.8 5 Such disclosure
was permitted by the judge on finding that the grand jury testimony
contained material discrepancies or significant facts which the witness
concealed or failed to remember at his deposition. When neither
of these circumstances was present, the application for examination
of the grand jury testimony was denied.8"
The actual use of a -transcript in the subsequent civil litigation
varies with the discretion -of the judge. Some judges have permitted
grand jury testimony to be read to the witness to see if it assists
him in refreshing his recollection.8 7 Some judges have required that
the testimony be shown first to the witness who was asked if it
refreshed his recollection.88 Of course, grand jury testimony if dis-
closed may be used for impeachment of the witness and read to
the witness and the jury as part of the question.
The witness' awareness that his prior grand jury testimony can be
disclosed often has a salutary effect on his memory in and of itself.
In fact, Judge Clary commented about one of the witnesses: "It is
quite apparent after the Court had held the written record of his
testimony not privileged, that his memory became sharper and keener
than it had been up to that time."8
C. Other Evidentiar'y Material
Related to the discovery of grand jury testimony is the question
of whether a private plaintiff can see so-called "debriefing" memo-
randa, summaries of the grand jury testimony of a company's em-
84. 210 F. Supp. at 490-91. See Note, supra note 7.
85. In re National Deposition of John T. Peters (unreported) (S.D.N.Y.,
motion granted December 18, 1962), leave to appeal and petition for writ of mandamus
denied sub nom., Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A.B. Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431 (2d Cir.
1963), application for stay denied, 372 U.S. 699 (1963) ; In re National Deposition
of Brenan R. Sellers, 32 F.R.D. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1962) ; In re National Deposition of
Donald J. Nairn (unreported) (E.D. Pa., motion granted December 18, 1962),
application for writs of mandamus and prohibition denied, 312 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1963) ;
Allis-Chalmers v. Fort Pierce, 323 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Consolidated Edison Co.
of New York, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 217 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
86. See, e.g., Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 707(S.D.N.Y. 1965). Many of the unreported cases and orders relevant to footnote 85
are referred to in the MANUAL, supra note 67, (pt. 2) at 222-27.
87. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 232 (1940).
88. See Note, supra note 7, at 1162.
89. Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 486, 487-88 (E.D.
Pa. 1962).
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ployees which are generally prepared by the company's lawyers from
information supplied by the company's employees soon after they
testify before the grand jury. The collection of such statements appears
to be a common procedure followed by most companies whose em-
ployees are subpoenaed to testify.
The fact that such statements are not protected by any grand jury
secrecy does not automatically make them available for plaintiff's
discovery. Defendants 'have argued that they are privileged, either
because they are work-product, or because they come within the scope
of the attorney-client privilege. In the electrical cases, statements
made by most employees were held not protected by the attorney-
client privilege." Since the corporation was the protected client, only
those employees who were in a position to control or take a substantial
part in a decision which the corporation may make upon the advice
of the attorney were considered to be protected by the corporation's
attorney-client privilege."
However, whether production of the statement would be ordered
depended upon whether the plaintiff showed "good cause" or special
circumstances sufficient to justify "invading the privacy of a lawyer
in preparing his case for trial."9 Therefore the deposition judge read
the statement and compared it with the witness' testimony to determine
if discrepancies existed.93
The availability of this source of evidence may now be foreclosed
by the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Decker"4 which is presently pending in the Supreme Court.
This court rejected the "control group" test and concluded that an em-
ployee of a corporation is sufficiently identified with the corporation
if he communicates with the company's lawyer at the direction of lis
superior, and if the subject matter of the communication or attorney's
advice is the performance of the employee's duties of employment.
A rich source of evidence unveiled in the prior government suit
90. See Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 32 F.R.D. 350, 351 (E.D.
Pa. 1962).
91. Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962),
enunciating the control group test which was followed in Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d
686, 692 (10th Cir. 1969) ; Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.
Cal. 1963); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 73,122(1970 Trade Cas.) (M.D. Pa. 1970).
92. Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 32 F.R.D. 350, 351 (E.D. Pa.
1962). "Granting plaintiffs' request for wholesale production of these summaries
would not be proper on the present record." Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda
American Brass Co., 41 F.R.D. 518, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
93. The "particularized need" which justifies disclosure is impeachment or recol-
lection-refreshing. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 41 F.R.D.
518, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
94. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 397 U.S. 1073 (1970), reversing
Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1969 Trade Cas. ff 72,965 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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is the bill of particulars requested by and furnished to the defendants
in the prior government criminal proceeding.
The utility of disclosure is obvious, for while the documents
themselves are not evidence and would not be directly involved
in the trial, they would clearly serve to pinpoint the trial issues,
and, more importantly, would give form and illumination to the
balance of the discovery process."
Other rich sources of material present in 'the government's files
can be made available to private plaintiffs by a sympathetic court.
In United States v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,9 6 after the
indictment was dismissed against Honda on -the ground of double
jeopardy because of a prior nolo contendere plea in a related case,
Honda moved the court to "seal" the record. Judge Edwin D. Robson,
one of the judges most familiar with the problems of private plaintiffs
since he served on the Judicial Coordinating Committee in the electrical
cases and now serves on the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
denied the motion. The file in the criminal proceeding contained
affidavits with evidentiary material filed by the defendant's officers
or employees. Apparently some of the material in the file contained
selected excerpts or summaries of grand jury proceedings. The court,
noting that the substantive material would have to be divulged anyway
upon depositions in the civil suit, said: "[T]here can therefore be no
detriment to movant, but only a saving of discovery time for plaintiffs
in the civil suit in not having to seek to elicit the same facts again.""
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has indicated
that protective orders entered in government actions which shield docu-
ments and information from private plaintiffs are not to be favored :
But neither in the express nor implied terms of the statutes or rules
is there any indication that a consenting defendant could gain the
additional benefit of holding under seal, or stricture of nondis-
closure, for an indefinite time, information which would otherwise
be available to the public or at least to other litigants who had need
of it.9
More recently, private treble damage plaintiffs in an antitrust case
pending in Chicago subpoenaed the chief of the Antitrust Division in
Philadelphia to appear at a deposition with sentencing memoranda sub-
95. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 41 F.R.D. 518, 519(E.D. Pa. 1967).
96. 1967 Trade Cas. ir 72,291 (N.D. Il1. 1967).
97. Id. at ff 72,291, p. 84725.
98. Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1964).
99. Id. at 265.
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mitted by the Antitrust Division to the Probation Department and to
the court in connection with the sentencing of the defendants in a prior
criminal action to which they -had pleaded nolo contendere. The court
held that although that portion of the memoranda which contained in-
formation educed through the grand jury proceedings was protected by
the grand jury secrecy, the Government would be required to indicate
what portions of the memoranda were not so grounded so that the court
could determine whet-her disclosure should be ordered. 100
The Justice Department recently indicated in the air pollution civil
cases that it would not oppose either the impounding of grand jury
transcripts, records and documents, or the discovery of third party docu-
ments which it obtained, provided their owners had notice and the op-
portunity to be heard as to the disclosure.' Thus, the extent of the evi-
dentiary assistance which the private plaintiff secures from the prior
government suit varies from case to case, depending on the attitude of
the court or the Department of Justice in that particular situation, rather
than on a consistent and predictable policy or procedure as embodied in
a statute or Department Rule.
V. ANALYSIS
To an increasing extent, the courts are taking cognizance of
congressional opinion that private antitrust litigation is "an important
component of the public interest in 'vigilant enforcement of the antitrust
law' "102 and that private litigants deserve assistance from government
suits in the prosecution of their claims for violation of the antitrust
laws.'08 However, after more than a half century of treble damage
plaintiffs serving as "private attorneys general"' °4 it is time to inquire
1) whether government suits have provided as much aid to these treble
damage plaintiffs as originally expected; 2) whether the government,
within the framework of existing statutes, could give more assistance,
and; 3) whether a new statutory scheme would be in the interest of jus-
tice, not only in enforcing the antitrust laws, but in expediting judicial
administration over private suits.
100. ABC Great States, Inc. v. Globe Ticket Co., 309 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Pa.
1970). After an in camera review by the court, disclosure of the memoranda was
denied because virtually all the facts were derived from testimony presented to the
grand jury.
101. See 433 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. at A-29 (1969).
102. Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264 (9th Cir. 1964).
103. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
311, 317-18 (1965); Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558,
568 (1951).
104. See Wham, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits: The Government's Chief Aid
in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954) ; Loevinger, Private Action - The Strongest
Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167, 173 (1958).
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In the summer of 1968, when the attention of the country through
the turmoil of the political conventions was focused on national prob-
lems and priorities, Judge John P. Fullam, of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, startled a meeting at an
American Bar Association subcommittee on Private Antitrust Litiga-
tion, by commenting:
But I would like to say it is going to be absolutely necessary for
private lawyers and lawyers in the Justice Department to work
out a more efficient method of developing the facts in these cases.
It seems to me that in this day and age we in this country simply
cannot afford to waste the efforts of the legal talent which we have
available. We have problems of society to solve, and lawyers are
needed to solve them. No doubt, antitrust is an important problem
area. But I wonder if anyone can rationally justify the concept of
high priced, highly skilled legal talent conducting file searches, for
example, in preparation for a treble-damage claim, going through
precisely the same files which 'the Justice Department has gone
through getting -the same information all over again. I wonder if
we can justify the amount of legal talent that is expended in at-
tempting to litigate discovery issues in antitrust case. It seems to
me that we are going to have to figure out some way of doing
things once, and once and for all, letting that information become
available -to all who need it.'
The concentration of time and effort which private treble-damage
actions require under the present system is well known and well docu-
mented. On January 20, 1970, 34 lawyers representing the treble dam-
age plaintiffs and the defendants in over 200 plumbing fixture antitrust
cases, which were consolidated under section 1407 of the Judicial
Code,'0 6 appeared in a Washington, D.C. courtroom to attend the
beginning of the deposition of one witness which continued for 23
days. 0 7 This deposition was scheduled to be followed by the deposi-
tions of at least 28 more witnesses called by the plaintiffs. This magni-
tude of discovery was requested by plaintiffs and ordered by the court
even though the criminal action upon which the damage cases were
based had resulted in a jury verdict of guilty as to three of the cor-
porate defendants (the other five having pleaded nolo contendere).18
The case before the jury took some 16 weeks.
105. Fullam, The Judicial View, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 866, 869 (1968).
106. In re Plumbing Fixtures, 295 F. Supp. 33 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
107. Pretrial Order No. 4, Schedule A. Philadelphia Housing Authority v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., Civil No. 41773 (E.D. Pa., January
20, 1970).
108. United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) f" 45,066 (W.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd 1970 Trade Cas.i" 73,331 (3d Cir. 1970). The criminal action was tried before the jury from Jan. 13,
1969 to May 2, 1969.
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In the gasoline cases, where discovery is now beginning upon ter-
mination of the government criminal suit after entry of nolo contendere
pleas,' 09 more than 50 lawyers attended the first pre-trial hearings in
Newark for discussion of the mechanics and schedules for proceeding.'
Nor are these isolated instances. In the electrical cases, despite
pleas of guilty by all defendants in the criminal cases dealing with
turbine generators and power transformers, there were at least two
lengthy trials by damage plaintiffs in each of these product lines before
the remainder of the damage actions were settled."' Several cases were
settled only after a jury had been impanelled and years of discovery
and pretrial procedure had been completed. Had settlement negotiations
failed, the courts would have been faced with many more trials, reliti-
gating the question of defendants' liability for an unlimited number of
cases based on the same operative facts, thus further clogging already
overcrowded dockets in overburdened district courts.
Hundreds of lawyers for hundreds of private plaintiffs must now
spend an incalculable amount of 'time rediscovering information which is
already in the possession of the Justice Department principally because
there is no way under the present statutory scheme in which private
plaintiffs can secure the full benefits of the prior government action.
Attempts by plaintiffs, sometimes assisted and sometimes opposed by
the Government, to be heard in or protected by the Government's
civil or criminal actions have failed. Moreover, there is considerable
question as to whether such intervention would or could under the
present statute ease the real burden on plaintiffs or the courts.
In the early 1960's the Government agreed to consent decrees in
suits alleging antitrust violations in the asphalt industries which specifi-
cally permitted subsequent civil plaintiffs to use the consent judgment
decree as prima facie evidence in treble damage actions. 1 2 Although
109. United States v. American Oil Co., 5 TRADE EG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.)
1 45,065 (D.N.J. 1969).
110. Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., et al., Civil No. 647-68 (D.N.J., March
6, 1970).
111. Power transformers: Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
No. 30015 (E.D. Pa., June 2, 1964); Northwestern Elec. Power Cooperative v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., Civil No. 13290-3 (W.D. Mo., December 16, 1964). Tur-
bines: Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
112. United States v. Allied Chemical Corp., 1961 Trade Cas. ff 69,923 (D. Mass.
1960); United States v. Bituminous Concrete Ass'n, Inc., 1960 Trade Cas. 1 69,878(D. Mass. 1960) ; United States v. The Lake Asphalt and Petroleum Co., 1960 Trade
Cas. 1 69,835 (D. Mass. 1960). An example of the paragraph in one of the consent
decrees is:
That on the basis of said limited admission the defendants signatory hereto
have engaged in an unlawful combination and conspiracy in violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act as charged in the said complaint, this adjudication being for
the sole purpose of establishing the prima facie effect of this Final Judgment, in
the suits specified below, and for no other purpose. Each defendant is enjoined
and restrained from denying that this Final Judgment has such prima facie effect
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from 70% to 75 % of all civil antitrust cases brought by the Government
end in consent judgments,"8 no other instance of such manifest concern
for the private plaintiffs appears in any other published consent judg-
ment." 4 Although one court held that the Government has no power
to insist on the inclusion of an "asphalt clause"," 5 the validity of that
judgment is questionable in the light of a subsequent Supreme Court
case vacating a consent decree which had been entered over the Govern-
ment's objection." 6 In any event the Government has never pursued
the issue to a consideration by the Supreme Court.
The extent to which the interests of private plaintiffs are con-
sidered by the Government in negotiating consent decrees is difficult
to assess. Since 1961, the Justice Department has required that all pro-
posed consent decrees be "filed in Court or otherwise made available
upon request to interested persons""' 7 at least 30 days before approval.
In all consent decrees negotiated since that time, the Department has
also reserved the right to withdraw or withhold its consent to the decree.
While the Department has maintained that its action in this respect
protects the interests of the private plaintiff, it has consistently and vig-
')rously opposed the attempt by such plaintiffs to intervene in the gov-
ernment civil action in order to be heard on the question of relief.
in any such suit; provided, however, that this section shall not be deemed to
prohibit any such defendant from rebutting such prima facie evidence or from
asserting any defense with respect to damages or other defenses available to it.
The specified suits referred to above are the suits instituted in this Court by
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts wherein the defendants signatory hereto
are named as defendants ... and any other suit instituted by any Massachusetts
city or town against any of the defendants signatory hereto prior to the date of
entry of this Final Judgment, and which alleges violation of The Federal Anti-
trust law and claims damages growing out of the purchases of Asphalt from any
such defendant.
Id. at 77,272.
113. Address by Donald F. Turner, then Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, December 19,
1967. See 336 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. at x-1 (1967).
114. Donald F. Turner when he was Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, stated that in negotiating consent decrees the Government will generally
insist on the full range that litigation might conceivably secure, and will depart from
that standard only when it has doubts as to the legal theory on which the case was
brought, or when there would be unusual difficulties in establishing the appropriate
facts at trial. He did not mention the effect on damage plaintiffs as one of the con-
siderations. Id. at x-1, 2. On the other hand, shortly thereafter, one of the chiefs
of a regional office of the antitrust division did indicate that the presence of damage
plaintiffs was one element to be considered by the government in deciding whether
to accept or reject a consent decree. Sarbaugh, The Government's View, 37 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 857, 860 (1968).
115. United States v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 203 F. Supp. 657 (E.D.
Wis. 1962). The provision originally proposed by the Government would have en-
joined the defendants from denying any suit brought by a state or political subdivision
on the ground that the defendant did not engage in a combination and conspiracy in
violation of the Sherman Act. Thereafter, the government modified its proposal to
require only an "asphalt clause" provision giving prima facie effect to the admission.
116. United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327 (1964).
117. 28 C.F.R. § 50.1(b).
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Generally, the courts have denied private parties the right to intervene
in proceedings relating to a consent decree.""
Private damage plaintiffs, relying on the decision in Cascade Nat-
ural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.," 9 which held that the State
of California and various private parties should have been permitted
to intervene as of right in hearings on the form of divestiture which
should be ordered as to a merger which violated antitrust laws, have
renewed their efforts to intervene in hearings on the advisability of en-
tering the consent decree negotiated between the defendants and the
Government. However, they have continuously been denied the right
to intervene. 20 The Government and some commentators have inter-
preted the Cascade decision as limited 'to its particular facts,' 2' and
have argued that intervention should not be allowed solely to protect
private damage claims.
On the other hand, the Government, in its criminal antitrust ac-
tions, has expressly referred to the interests of private plaintiffs in its
objections to the acceptance of nolo contendere pleas. Richard McLaren,
Assistant Attorney General, Chief Antitrust Division, has stated, sub-
ject to certain qualifications, that: "The Division will ordinarily oppose
pleas of nolo contendere in cases where a guilty plea or a conviction
after ;trial will be of meaningful aid to private parties who may have
suffered substantial damages as a result of the offense"' 2 Nevertheless,
the Government's opposition to nolo contendere pleas is ineffective in
96% of the cases.' 23
Defendants freely admit that their prime motive and advantage in
offering such pleas is that the plea is not available as prima facie evi-
118. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432, 439 (C.D. Cal.
1967), aff'd sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580(1968) ; Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961); United
States v. R.C.A., 186 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Pa. 1960), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 364 U.S. 518 (1960) ; United States
v. American Soc'y of Composers, 11 F.R.D. 511, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
119. 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
120. United States v. Harper & Row Publishers, 1967 Trade Cas. ff 72,256 (N.D.
Ill. 1968), aff'd mem. sub noma. New York v. United States, 390 U.S, 715 (1968);
United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd
sub nom. New York v. United States, et al., 397 U.S. 248 (1970) ; United States v.
CIBA Corp., 1970 Trade Cas. 5 73,319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
121. See argument made by Government in United States v. Automobile Mfrs.
Ass'n, supra note 101. The Cascade ruling was termed "sui generis" by the Court in
United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617, 619 at n.3 (C.D. Cal.
1969). See also Archer, The Defendant's View, 38 ANTITRUST L.J. 837, 848 (1968).
122. McLaren, The Government and the Private Antitrust Suit, 440 ANTITRUST
& TRADE RFG. REP. x-16 (1969). In contrast, Acting Assistant Attorney General
Bicks in 1960 categorically denied that the Government's opposition to the nolo con-
tendere pleas had anything to do with the interest of any private litigant. United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. ff 69,699 (E.D. Pa. 1960)
at 76,759.
123. Fullam, supra note 105, at 867.
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dence in private treble damage actions.' 24 Most courts, in accepting the
nolo contendere plea, have rejected the consideration of assistance to
the treble damage plaintiff.'25 The minority opinion was expressed by
Judge Weinfeld, who rejected the proffered nolo pleas stating:
If a defendant in fact has violated the antitrust laws it would not be
in the public interest that he have 'the aid of the Court to add to
the admittedly heavy burden of the victim seeking redress, thereby
decreasing the prospect of private treble damage recovery with its
punitive value and possible deterrent effect. Instead of the heavy
burden being lightened it would be rendered more difficult.' 26
Several recent attempts in Congress to enact bills which would
give nolo contendere pleas the same prima facie effect as guilty pleas
under Sec'tion 5a'27 have failed, despite 'the support of the Department
of Justice.12" Although plaintiffs' antitrust lawyers have favored such
a change 129 and defendants' antitrust lawyers have, just as obviously,
opposed it,' 0 experience has shown that while such a bill might assist
plaintiffs in winning a verdict and recovering damages, it would not
make any change in the manner in which antitrust cases are presently
handled. Discovery would not be measurably shortened. Even with
the prima facie rule, plaintiff's lawyers will not rely on 'the guilty plea
alone. ' It has been suggested that the advantage of a nolo plea over
124. United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 1957 Trade Cas. 1 68,713 (D. Colo.
1957) at 72,873-75; See also United States v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 1964 Trade
Gas. f] 71,319 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Statement of Bruce Bromley at the Senate Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 41, 43 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
125. Judge Estes related the fundamental reason for the court's disposition:
"This court does not believe that Congress intended that pleas of noo contendere be
refused in criminal antitrust cases for the purpose of aiding private litigants under
Section 5 of the Clayton Act." United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 20 F.R.D.
451, 457 (N.D. Tex. 1957). Some courts have accepted nolo contendere pleas in
criminal cases pointing to the existence of companion civil suits in which the Govern-
ment could protect the private plaintiff in determining whether to accept a consent
decree. United States v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. ff 71,319 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) ; United States v. Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 212, 213(S.D.N.Y. 1955). Other judges have commented that the Government policy to
oppose all attempts to enter a plea of nolo contendere lead the courts to question
whether the opposition is seriously offered. United States v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n,
Inc., 1959 Trade Cas. 1 69,435 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See also Fullam, supra note 105,
at 867.
126. United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 173(S.D.N.Y. 1955) ; followed in United States v. Klahr, 1963 Trade Cas. 1 70,815
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
127. The current bill is S. 2157. Previously, the Senate Subcommittee, supra
note 124, did not pass out of committee S. 2512, which would have made other changes
in addition to giving nolo contendere pleas prima facie effect. See Hearings, supra
note 124, at 3.
128. Testimony of Donald F. Turner, Hearings, supra note 124, at 86.
129. See testimony of Harold E. Kohn, Hearings, supra note 124, at 22; testimony
of Joseph L. Alioto, Hearings, supra note 124, at 45; testimony of Thomas C.
McConnell, Hearings, supra note 124, at 7.
130. See testimony of Bruce Bromley, Hearings, supra note 124, at 31.
131. See testimony of Thomas C. McConnell, Hearings, supra note 124, at 9, 11, 17.
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a guilty plea can be overrated in so far as the consequences in subse-
quent treble damage actions. 82
One effective way to avoid the proliferation of cases in which the
issue of liability must be redetermined on the basis of the same facts
would be to provide that a judgment of guilty, in a prior criminal action
whether by guilty plea or after trial, collaterally estops defendants from
denying the issue of liability in subsequent damage actions, provided
they are based on the same cause of action alleged in the criminal suit.
Application of collateral estoppel principles in instances of civil
proceedings following criminal actions is not novel in the law. If the
Government has successfully proved an antitrust conspiracy in a crimi-
nal action, the facts are conclusively determined against the defendants
in a civil injunction action brought by the Government.'
The use and concept of collateral estoppel was, until recently,
limited to suits brought between the same parties. However, reexami-
nation of the basic concepts indicates that there is nothing inherently
unfair or violative of due process in holding that a party may not reliti-
gate against a different party those issues which he has already litigated
and lost in the first suit.
In many cases the courts have recognized that the old and rigid
principle of mutuality which would permit application of the collateral
estoppel principle only to the same parties or their privies was more a
matter of technical symmetry than one of essential fairness.' More
than a hundred years ago, Jeremy Bentham characterized the need for
mutuality of estoppel as "a maxim which one would suppose to have
132. Kramer, Subsequent Use of the Record and Proceedings in a Criminal Case,
38 ANTITRUST L.J. 300 (1969).
133. Teamsters Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934). Such holdings
have been common in tax cases. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262(5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965) ; Moore v. United States, 360 F.2d
353 (4th Cir. 1965) ; Amos v. Commissioner, 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965).
134. See, e.g., Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut.
Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1969) (insurance company against which jury deter-
mined issue of coverage under omnibus clause held bound against retrying that issue
as to other parties in the same accident) ; Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344
F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965) (plaintiff was estopped to allege negligence of employee
against employer, when employee had previously sued successfully in first suit);
Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964) (con-
struction of a union contract adverse to position of employer held applicable to other
group of employees not named in original suit) ; United States v. Webber, 396 F.2d
381 (3d Cir. 1968) (defendant subcontractor was collaterally estopped from defend-
ing government suit on basis of contingent fee agreement which had previously been
held illegal) ; Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 865 (1950) (longshoreman who lost action for negligence and unseaworthiness
against steamship company which served vessel was estopped from bringing similar
claim against United States) ; United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp.
709 (E.D. Wash. and D. Nev. 1962), aff'd on the issue of collateral estoppel, sub nom.
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379, 404 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379
U.S. 951 (1964) (verdict on liability against United Air Lines in California actions
held to estop defendant from defending suits in other districts brought by plaintiffs in
same position as California plaintiffs).
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found its way from the gaming-table to the bench"."3 5 More recently,
Judge Traynor, in the Bernhard case,13 rejected the doctrine of mutu-
ality of estoppel and held that only three questions were pertinent to the
validity of the application of collateral estoppel: 1) Was the issue de-
cided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the
action in question? 2) Was there a final judgment on the merits? and
3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity
with a party to the prior adjudication ?117
The dichotomy which was subsequently suggested - between use
of the collateral estoppel principle against one who has the initiative
in the first action as against one who did not' - has not been accepted
by most of the courts who have instead concentrated on the real issue
of whether the party had an ample opportunity to litigate the issue fully
in the first proceeding. 13
9
There appears to be no reason why this principle should not be
applied to antitrust cases. Certainly a defendant in a criminal action
under the antitrust laws has sufficient incentive to litigate fully his
guilt or innocence, and holding that the record of the criminal con-
viction is conclusive evidence of the offense charged in subsequent civil
litigation merely follows similar rulings in other types of offenses. 4 °
Although the principle of collateral estoppel has been extended in
most areas of the law by judicial opinion, it is unlikely that it would be
applied in antitrust laws without new legislation. The existence of sec-
tion 5 (a) of the Clayton Act makes it questionable whether Congress
in fact intended that collateral estoppel apply. Thus, in United States 2?.
Grinnell,'4 1 the Government, having been successful in an injunction
action against defendants for violation of the antitrust laws, attempted
to use the prior decision to collaterally estop defendants from denying
liability in a damage case. Although the parties were the same, and
thus, under well accepted principles, collateral estoppel should have
applied, the court refused to allow application of that doctrine. It held
that Congress, by the enactment of section 5(a) making the prior
135. J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 171 (Bowring ed. 1843).
136. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
137. Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 895. Followed in Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. The
Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, (1962) ; Schwartz
v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969); Sanderson
v. Balfour, 109 N.H. 213, 247 A.2d 185 (1968).
138. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957).
139. See cases in notes 134, 137, supra. Currie himself appears to have withdrawn
from his earlier position. Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF.
L. REV. 25 (1965).
140. Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624 (1965) ; Pennsylvania Turnpike
Comm'n v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 412 Pa. 222, 194 A.2d 423 (1963).
141. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 73,016 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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judgment merely prima facie evidence, must have intended this more
limited use. If a judgment would have conclusive effect under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, any other reading would make the
entire prima facie provision "mere surplus verbiage." '142
Presumably, the same reasoning would apply in damage actions by
private third party plaintiffs.'48 It is thus ironic that the very section
originally intended to assist private plaintiffs in their use of govern-
ment actions may operate instead to prevent application of new judicial
concepts for their benefit.
If an amendment to the antitrust laws were enacted which would
estop defendants from contesting liability if they had pleaded or been
adjudged guilty, an obvious complementary action would be to elimi-
nate the defendant's use of the nolo contendere plea in such cases, either
by precluding its use 144 or by providing that it would be equated with
a plea of guilty for the purposes of statutory collateral estoppel. The
validity of such a plea has already been questioned, 45 and its use
serves only to dilute 'the deterrent effect of 'treble damage liability on
prospective defendants.
One effect of such amendment would undoubtedly be an increase
in the number of criminal trials by the Antitrust Division. However,
some determination as to priorities should be made. Under present
practice, government lawyers work for years in preparation for the trial
of a criminal action, only to have the defendant submit the nolo con-
tendere pleas on the eve of trial,146 after which private plaintiffs must
begin anew the years of work and discovery.
The Justice Department, supporting the amendment which would
give prima facie effect to nolo contendere pleas, recognized that one
result would be that the Department would try more cases and need
142. Id.
143. In Purex Corp., Ltd. v. The Procter & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584, 589-90(C.D. Cal. 1970), the court, while holding an FTC order had prima facie effect,
refused to accord it collateral estoppel effect saying:
But application here of the principle of collateral estoppel, as urged by the
plaintiff, would mean that the Commission order would be conclusive as to all
matters to which it applied. The Commission order cannot be both prima facie
and conclusive; and, it having been determined that the statute applies, the
statute must govern. Accordingly, the principle of collateral estoppel is adjudged
not to be applicable to this case, and the defendants are not estopped to deny
anything expressed or implied in the Commission order.
144. Nolo contendere is not a constitutional plea but is referred to in rule 11 of
the FED. R. CRIM. P. It is recognized in a number of states, and appears to have
been given its major modern impetus in antitrust cases. See Plea of Nolo Contendere
in American Law (prepared by the Library of Congress), and Report on the Plea
of Nolo Contendere in English Law, Hearings, supra note 124, at 111.
145. Fullam, supra note 105, at 867.
146. Indictment No. 153-65 in United States v. American Oil Co., was filed April
8, 1965. After numerous legal and discovery maneuvers, trial was finally set for
January 3, 1970, after which defendants pleaded nolo contendere at various times
in 1969. See 5 TRADE REG. REP. 11 45,065 (D.N.J. 1969).
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additional staff, but believed the additional expenditures would be justi-
tified.147 The effect of the amendment suggested here would be that
those trials, if adverse to :the defendants, would at least prevent the
duplicative effort now underway.
Another result might be that the Government would be encouraged
to limit the number of criminal actions. In so doing it could select
those cases where the defendants were repeated violators, or the harm
caused to the economy or to competition was substantial, or the damages
were so widespread, particularly to local governmental units, that it
would be appropriate to marshall the resources of the Justice Depart-
ment in proving liability, with the attendant collateral estoppel effect.
In those cases where the Department believed the proof was not as
strong, or the legal questions somewhat new or questionable, or other
mitigating circumstances existed, the Department could bring civil
actions, which would not be awarded the statutory collateral estoppel
effect. It could then negotiate consent decrees, insisting, if appropriate,
upon some version of an "asphalt clause."
The extent to which defendants would actually insist on trials if
there were a collateral estoppel amendment is of course difficult to
assess. It has been suggested by counsel for defendants that there are
many reasons why corporate defendants seek to avoid a criminal trial.
Adverse harm to the corporate public image, the expenditure of time
and peace of mind of its executives and employees, and the divulging,
on the public record, of secret corporate facts, policies and plans 4 ' all
militate against the defendant's going to trial.
Nor would a collateral estoppel rule automatically give private
plaintiffs high verdicts, since in each instance, the plaintiff would still
be required to prove that it was damaged by the violation, and establish
the extent of the damage.149 Corporate defendants might prefer to
plead guilty and accept collateral estoppel as to liability, rather than
placing on the record in the criminal trials extensive facts which would
assist plaintiffs in the damage aspects of their cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
It can be anticipated that the suggestion of new legislation which
would give collateral estoppel effect to successful government criminal
147. Testimony of Donald F. Turner, Hearings, supra note 124, at 85.
148. Testimony of Bruce Bromley, Hearings, supra note 124, at 31, 42.
149. Injury and damage alone were the issues tried in E.V. Prentice Mach. Co. v.
Associated Plywood Mills, Inc., 252 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 951(1958). The case resulted in a verdict for defendants on the ground that plaintiffs
did not sustain damages.
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actions under the antitrust laws and eliminate the advantage of nolo
contendere pleas will be vigorously opposed by many who believe that
the antitrust laws are already too heavily weighted in favor of the Gov-
ernment and private plaintiffs. However, the fact remains that despite
years of enforcement of these laws, widespread violations continue to be
uncovered.
Thus, in the last analysis the question is really whether the anti-
trust laws, and private enforcement thereof, serve a significant function
in our society. One court has commented:
We pass to the fundamental issue which is at the heart of the
controversy. The antitrust statutes, as .has so often been em-
phasized, are aimed at assuring that our competitive enterprise
system shall operate freely and competitively. They seek to rid
our economy of monopolistic and unreasonable restraints. Upon
their vigorous and constant enforcement depends the economic,
political and social well-being of our nation. The concept that anti-
trust violations really are "minor" and "technical" infractions, in-
volve no wrongdoing, and merely constitute "white collar" offenses,
has no place in the administration of justice. Ever since the pas-
sage in 1890 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, referred to by Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes as a "charter of freedom", Congress has
shown constant and increasing concern over practices which de-
stroy economic competition.'5 0
If this is the generally accepted view, then some effective means
must be found which, while giving defendants due process and the op-
portunity for a full day in court in the Government's suit, will also elimi-
nate the waste of time and effort of lawyers and courts in repeatedly
sifting through the same facts and issues previously conceded by de-
fendants or determined against them by other triers of fact. The legis-
lation suggested above would contribute to accomplishing this result and
help avoid the duplication of effort which our society can ill afford.
150. United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 170-71(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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